Ignacio garcia bercero born

After the fall of Communism he answered his civic calling and has over a twenty year career tirelessly campaigned to raise the living standards of Romanians through the modernisation of the economy and higher standards in public life. Since Peter has been Chief Executive of Which? It is a non-governmental-organisation NGO funded in a very unusual way - it receives no funding from either government or the general public.

All its income comes from commercial activities in line with its charitable status. Before joining Which? In addition, Ms. Prior to moving to Brussels, Ms. In that position, she directed a staff of 4, employees across the United States and had responsibility for import safety, inspections, laboratory testing and enforcement policy for all FDA-regulated products.

Prior to that, Mr. Trarieux has a postgraduate degree in agricultural economics from the University of Montpellier, France, and an agronomist engineer diploma from the Montpellier-based Agricultural College. The unit also dealt with the sustainability and competitiveness of the chemicals industry in the European Union. He studied chemistry at the universities of Heidelberg, Freiburg, and Stanford, and obtained a PhD in polymer chemistry from the University of Freiburg Germany.

Ignacio garcia bercero born: Mr García Bercero holds

Philippe Jean was born in and joined the European Commission in He has worked in a number of areas, such as trade negotiations, steel policy, functioning of the internal market. Liikanen, where he was responsible for industrial files, including those relating to the automotive sector. He looks after aspects of automotive industry competitiveness and is responsible for the legislative framework for type-approval of vehicles.

Paul Adamson is the editor-in-chief and founding publisher of E! He is also a member of the advisory group of British Influence, a new organization promoting the UK's role in the European Union and chairs the Trans-Atlantic Business Council working group on communications and public outreach. Earlier in his career he founded the consulting firm Adamson Associates, which was sold to WeberShandwick and the "think-do tank" The Centre, which was sold to Edelman.

Lesina include ensuring compliance with international telecom regulations, and advocacy on a wide range policy matters related to the stable growth, innovation and investment by the information and communications technology sector. He is an active member in several industry and community organizations, including current service as: Chair of the Presidency Group and of the Digital Economy Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce to the EU.

Lesina held senior positions with another leading US-headquartered ICT company Intel Corporationand a number of leading public affairs agencies in Brussels. Born in Dakar Senegal Mr. He advises BSA members on public policy and legal developments and advocates the views of the ICT sector with both European and national policy makers. He leads on security and privacy issues as well as broader efforts to improve levels of intellectual property protection and to promote open markets, fair competition, and technology innovation in new areas such as cloud computing.

In this role, he also served as policy and regulatory adviser for both EU and US telecom operators. SinceMr. Cohen has been responsible for global public policy for eBay, adding PayPal when it was acquired in His team of over employees includes lawyers, lobbyists, external affairs specialists, and investigators in more than 20 cities around the world.

Prior to joining eBay, Mr. Before that, Mr. Cohen formerly served as a member of the U. Cohen received his B. Before law school, Mr. Cohen worked as a Congressional aide for four years. Prior joining the Commission, he worked for the Belgian Ministry of Health where he was contributing to the implementation of the Novel Food legislation and to the coordination of official controls on GMOs and food contaminants.

He has previously been working for the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry as state secretary. In addition, Mr. Pesonen has professional experience in EU lobbying and in Finnish food industry. He is an agricultural economist and he has a family of wife and three young children. As ofhis responsibilities were extended to energy, raw materials and industry related matters.

In the periodPetros Sourmelis was the Head of the DG Trade Unit in charge of international negotiations in the area of trade in services ignacio garcia bercero born investment. Petros is Greek. He has post-graduate DEA degrees in international public law and international private law from the University of Paris-I. He joined the European Commission services in She comes with 22 years of experience from the pharmaceutical industry, covering roles in different geographic regions within public affairs, government affairs, brand public affairs, and commercial support.

Eva Joined Pfizer in She is a lawyer by training, specialized in European law, IP and trade law. In she transferred back to Europe and in roles of increasing responsibility worked on policy and brand issues for the European Region. He is a career European Commission official, having held positions in the monetary, international economic affairs and internal market directorate generals of the EU Executive.

He is an economist by training, and started his career as a corporate banker for a French bank in the city of London. Sylvain studied political sciences, international law and business administration in Strasbourg and Paris and post-graduated in European Administration at the college of Europe in Bruges. She has more than 25 years of work experience with industry, national authorities, the European Commission and trade associations.

In Sweden she worked 8 years for the pharmaceutical industry and ignacio garcia bercero born years for Authorities, mainly for the Chemicals Inspectorate. She joined the Commission, DG Industry, in with responsibility for harmonisation of chemicals legislation, notably restrictions on the marketing and use of dangerous substances. Previously, he has worked in a number of roles in Europe at Renault.

Mr Bergelin was born in France and is a French and Swedish national. To maintain a strategic focus, both sides should prioritise rapid agreement on a political declaration that should include cooperation both on foreign policy and security, and on global trade and economic challenges. Trade policy has fundamentally changed since the UK voted to leave the EU.

Moreover, the return of President Donald Trump could trigger major challenges for the transatlantic partnership that the EU and UK have an interest in managing in a coordinated manner. Trade policy now also needs to consider how to promote economic security in a context of US-China geopolitical competition, how to contribute to the climate and digital transitions and how to ensure proper articulation between trade and industrial policies, while increasing productivity and growth.

As economies highly dependent on international trade, both the EU and the UK have a vital interest in managing these transitions in a manner that preserves, and hopefully reinforces, the rules-based trading system under the World Trade Organisation, and to consolidate partnerships with countries committed to open and rules-based trade. To make this possible, there should be a political forum where both sides can look into trade and global economic challenges from a strategic perspective, including consideration of trade-offs and by exploring how best to promote common interests globally.

UK foreign minister, David Lammy, has proposed that the UK and the EU agree on a framework for cooperation on foreign policy and security, and has suggested that such a framework should also encompass economic security and climate cooperation.

Ignacio garcia bercero born: Born in , Mr

A joint declaration on cooperation on foreign policy and security could be an early result for the reset Scazzieri, But there would also be merit in considering a broader political declaration that encompasses cooperation on foreign policy, security and global economic and trade challenges. Effective cooperation on these issues needs to fully engage senior officials in the European Commission and ministers in the UK government other than foreign ministries.

The political declaration could create a ministerial forum that would meet regularly to discuss global trade and economic challenges and report to the EU-UK Summit. On trade, the forum could discuss initially four areas of cooperation, though these could be expanded to other areas in the future. To respond to it, the EU and the UK have cooperated closely on the application of economic sanctions.

In terms of economic security, western allies are highly dependent on China for raw materials that are critical for the climate transition, and on semiconductors from Taiwan. There is also a need to maintain joint technology leadership and prevent leakage of critical technologies with a military application. Developing risk-mitigation strategies to respond to these threats entails difficult trade-offs.

Neither the EU nor the UK would wish to follow policies that hinder economic growth, the fulfilment of climate targets or support for the WTO rules-based framework. The Trump administration may opt to disengage from WTO reform efforts, in particular those relating to dispute-settlement reform. Trump has also threatened 10 percent to 20 percent tariffs on all WTO members and 60 percent tariffs on China.

This represents an existential threat to the rules-based system. Beyond the WTO, the EU and the UK could cooperate in developing an approach to economic-security that reconciles a commitment to open trade with measures to respond to economic-security challenges in a proportionate manner. This could provide ignacio garcia bercero born basis to develop common positions in the context of G7 economic security discussions, including cooperation with countries such as Japan that share a similar perspective.

The EU and the UK will be early movers in the adoption of carbon measures at the border. They could therefore consider a joint diplomatic initiative to reinforce international cooperation on carbon pricing. This initiative should recognise the wide variety of carbon-pricing schemes and of carbon prices and the need to support developing countries in setting up and further developing carbon-pricing schemes in line with their institutional capacities and domestic needs.

The initiative should be open to other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries with a carbon price, such as Canada, Japan or Korea. It should also be open to emerging economies in the G Issues to be covered could include the interoperability of carbon-pricing schemes, including how to take into account carbon pricing in other jurisdictions when applying border carbon measures, support for capacity building and financial support for the decarbonisation of electricity sectors.

The EU and the UK could also consider exempting least-developed countries from their border carbon measures, subject to appropriate safeguards. The EU and the UK both intend to use industrial policies to promote growth and competitiveness. The European Commission could explore the development of an industrial policy at EU level, which would include in a number of cases the use of subsidies to promote the deployment of green technologies, assist decarbonisation of energy intensive industries and avoid excessive dependencies as outlined in Draghi, The UK government has also announced the intention to adopting a new industrial policy as one of its flagship projects.

The TCA includes wide-ranging commitments on subsidies that go beyond the provisions of other trade agreements. As both parties make more frequent use of subsidies, there may be more potential for conflict. The EU-UK Partnership Council, which oversees implementation of the TCA, might therefore provide guidance on what types of energy and environment subsidies would not normally have negative impacts on trade and investment.

This would provide greater predictability, as many subsidies to be applied in the EU and the UK will relate to the climate transition. The development of more detailed guidance on the implementation of the TCA level playing field provisions on subsidies is not only of significance for bilateral trade. It could also provide a useful input into informal WTO discussions on how to improve international disciplines on subsidies.

While there is no prospect of the EU joining the CPTPP, there is a strategic interest in reinforcing trade relations with countries in the Pacific region. This cooperation could cover potential joint principles on WTO reform, regulatory challenges relating to the green and digital transitions, supply-chain resilience and economic security. It includes common rules of origin,which were updated and will enter into force 1 January The EU and UK will need to decide on the best institutional framework to pursue cooperation on global trade and economic issues.

Such discussions could best be held in a ministerial forum, which could meet in the margins of G7 and G20 meetings and in advance of EU-UK Summits to report on the progress achieved. The forum will be responsible for following up the trade and economic aspects of the political declaration mentioned in section 2, while foreign policy and security would have a separate follow-up track.

The TCA is far from fulfilling its potential. Since the conclusion in of the Windsor Framework on Northern Ireland, the EU and UK have developed a more cooperative relationship, which ignacio garcia bercero born also lead to improved discussions on the implementation of the agreement in different committees and in the EU-UK Partnership Council, which is the main decision-making body under the TCA.

At the same time, the TCA foresees the possibility of negotiating supplementary agreements that complement the TCA or modify certain aspects of it, for instance to expand services commitments or to modify rules of origin. There is also the option of negotiating side agreements outside the common institutional structure of the TCA. Apart from the economic gains, a veterinary agreement based on regulatory alignment and the non-application of border carbon measures to bilateral trade would significantly reduce potential areas of tension under the Windsor Framework.

Before negotiations on sectoral agreements start, a scoping exercise should lead to a clear understanding of the parameters under which agreements are possible. This is essential to head off the risk of incompatible negotiating mandates. To succeed, negotiations should identify approaches that offer gains to both sides.

Ignacio garcia bercero born: Ignacio Garcia Bercero is

Each sectoral negotiation would need to be balanced in terms of mutual interests. This could make it possible to conclude agreements in certain areas, even if negotiations remain ongoing in others. At the same time, negotiations can only succeed if the major interests of both sides are ignacio garcia bercero born. It is difficult for instance to imagine the conclusion of a veterinary agreement, which would ease trade in fisheries products significantly, if no agreement has been reached on a stable regime for access to fisheries resources, to apply after The agreements discussed in this Policy Brief should be accompanied by an agreement to facilitate trade in electricity, which can entail major benefits for both sides Heussaff et al Both sides stand to gain significantly in both economic and political terms from limiting to a minimum the border controls applicable to trade in agriculture and fisheries products.

A common regulatory framework for sanitary and phytosanitary matters for the whole of the UK will also reduce substantially the need for border controls in trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. A veterinary agreement would however only achieve these objectives if the UK were ready to commit to maintain regulatory alignment with the EU.

An agreement of the type that the EU has concluded with third countries, such as New Zealand, would do little to eliminate border controls and is unlikely to be in the economic interest of the EU. This implies that a mutually beneficial agreement is likely to be close to the agreement that the EU has with Switzerland, and which at time of writing is being updated.

The EU also stands to gain from the absence of regulatory obstacles to trade and is unlikely therefore to object to an agreement that provides close to single market treatment for the agriculture and fisheries sectors. This would justify providing to the UK the same treatment in this sector given to Switzerland and Norway, even if the UK does not commit to free movement.

The EU will need to obtain a negotiating mandate, and it is therefore critical to have a good common understanding on the parameters for the negotiations before they are launched. These discussions would need to consider, in particular, the scope of the agreement, the extent of regulatory alignment and the relationship with the TCA legal framework.

An important issue will be that, in order to fully eliminate custom controls, alignment needs to be maintained over time and should relate not only to primary legislation but also to secondary legislation adopted by the Commission, and decisions on checks on imports from third countries 14 The UK has largely maintained regulatory alignment with primary legislation, but the situation is less clear for secondary rules on issues such as pesticide authorisations, for which authority now rests with ministries Lydgate and Anthony, Departing from alignment at these three levels is likely to require maintaining some degree of checks at the border.

The TCA dispute settlement procedure is based on the establishment of an arbitration tribunal. The EU is likely to insist that if a dispute raises issues relating to the interpretation of EU law, the arbitration tribunal should suspend procedures and refer the matter to the CJEU. This procedure already exists under the agreement on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, for instances in which EU law applies and, in particular, for those areas under the Windsor Framework for which Northern Ireland needs to maintain alignment with EU law.

There is no reason therefore why making such a procedure applicable to the entirety of the UK should be considered a breach of sovereignty. Two further political questions will need to be answered. A commitment to maintain alignment with EU regulations may trigger objections from the US or Canada, which may seek changes to current UK food-safety requirements.

The UK will therefore need to make a political choice. For both economic and UK public opinion reasons, it would seem that a veterinary agreement with the EU may enjoy more support than the prospect of changing regulations in sensitive areas in exchange for very uncertain and limited economic gains. The second issue is the linkage with fisheries negotiations.

Regardless of whether this is explicitly provided for in the EU negotiating mandate, this is a political reality that needs to be anticipated and managed by both sides. Both the EU and the UK consider themselves climate leaders and have adopted legally binding commitments to achieve carbon neutrality by Although the TCA encourages the linking of their respective emission trading schemes ETSin practice carbon prices have diverged significantly Figure 2.

This price divergence implies that the introduction of border carbon charges by both the EU and the UK could have a significant impact on trade, particularly for trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain and for trade in electricity 15 On the broader issue of improving EU-UK energy and climate cooperation, see Heussaff et al Figure 2: EU and UK carbon prices.

Source: Bruegel based on Statista. CBAM is the EU mechanism to equalise the carbon price paid on certain domestically produced and imported energy-intensive commodities. It is often mentioned that ETS linkage negotiations with Switzerland took 10 years but this was due to negative political developments in the broader relationship and to the need for Switzerland to extend its ETS to the aviation sector.

In the context of improved bilateral relations and with ETS that are similar in scope and design, there is no reason why an EU-UK linkage agreement should not be negotiated much more quickly. If negotiations are concluded before the end ofit should be possible for the UK to be ignacio garcia bercero born a time-limited exemption from CBAM pending ratification Born and Reland, The annex to the EU-Switzerland agreement lays down essential criteria that need to be met so that both the Swiss and the EU ETS have comparable levels of ambition and similar designs.

These annexes could therefore provide a good reference point for technical discussions to prepare negotiations on an EU-UK linkage agreement. At first sight, the most significant difference is that, unlike the EU, the UK has not established a schedule for the phasing out of free carbon allowances. Beyond the ETS linkage, there is a strong case for the EU and the UK to harmonise at least those aspects of their CBAMs for which regulatory divergence either increases the burden for third countries exporting to the EU or the UK, or results in a risk of trade deflection.

This is particularly the case for administrative requirements, such as the methodologies to account for carbon emissions or the application of default values. The UK has not yet decided on the precise features of its CBAM, and the European Commission still needs to adopt a series of implementing acts before the application of import charges.

The discussions with the UK on coordination of CBAMs should be approached in an open manner since both sides face the challenge of how to ensure effective application of border carbon measures while reducing excessive administrative burdens or negative impacts on trade with least-developed countries. As discussed in section 3. The European Commission proposal for an agreement also included certain elements that would be difficult for the UK to accept.

The UK meanwhile has identified two priorities — mobility for touring artists and mutual recognition of professional qualifications — that are either technically difficult or hard to achieve in the short term. It has not been helpful either that the Commission has dismissed the UK request on touring artists on the formal argument that meeting it would imply changes to the TCA.

These failures of communication illustrate the risks of uncoordinated public positioning and incompatible mandates. An agreement to negotiate an EU-UK youth mobility scheme has become a threshold issue for the reset. Although it does not constitute a trade agreement, there is a risk that failure to launch negotiations on youth mobility may derail negotiations on the trade agenda.

It is therefore urgent and essential that both sides engage in discussions to test respective flexibilities. One option would be to explore whether a supplementary agreement to the TCA could go beyond youth mobility and also include the facilitation of cultural exchanges. This could help to address at least the visa-related aspects of the UK request on mobility for touring artists, and would reinforce the perception that the agreement is win-win and addresses the priorities of both sides.

It may also be a way of avoiding concerns about including commitments on culture-related activities in the services chapter of the TCA. Regardless of what is identified as the way forward on youth mobility and touring artists, it is important to note that the review of the TCA in can consider improvements to services commitments. BusinessEurope has made similar recommendations.

There is therefore an opportunity to identify a mutually beneficial package of commitments that would facilitate the mobility of professionals, especially as concerns about disruption of business links may increase as both sides reinforce border controls. On mutual recognition of professional qualifications, it may be difficult to achieve much progress in the short term since some of the professions for which there may be a greater interest in facilitating mobility are not yet subject to automatic mutual recognition within the EU.

Further deepening of the single market may create more opportunities in the future. Both sides could however consult their professional bodies in harmonised areas to identify whether there is mutual interest in developing agreements on mutual recognition. They could also identify whether it is possible to solve outstanding issues related to the conclusion of a mutual recognition agreement on architects.

The agreements discussed in this Policy Brief could be complemented by other initiatives outside the context of the TCA. In particular, the UK could consider joining the revised Pan-Euro-Med Convention PEM on rules of origin, which would make it possible to facilitate integration of value chains through cumulation with other Convention signatories.

An option could be for both sets of rules to apply in parallel, with operators given the choice of relying on one or the other. Discussions on rules of origin are also likely to cover to what extent the TCA deadline for increasing local content for batteries and vehicles to 55 percent can be met or should be adjusted.

Ignacio garcia bercero born: Ignacio Garcia Bercero. Director, DG TRADE,

The agreements discussed in the previous section would facilitate trade and prevent the emergence of new trade obstacles, but they could hardly be considered as transformative, nor would they have a significant impact on the growth prospects of the UK economy, or even less the EU economy. For the UK, the main potential economic value of closer trade relations with the EU would be to reduce uncertainty for investments by offering guarantees that the UK and the EU would remain closely aligned in terms of regulation, and that trade frictions in European value chains would be minimised.

Regardless of any agreement with the EU, there is therefore merit in the UK adopting unilaterally a policy that commits to eliminating passive regulatory divergence 18 Passive regulatory divergence arises when EU updates its rules, while UK retains the rules existing at the time it left the EU. This is different from cases in which there is a policy decision to diverge.

While this would not in itself guarantee improved access to the EU market, UK business would benefit from greater regulatory certainty and a level playing field, since a single regulatory regime would apply to all goods marketed in the UK. Regulatory cooperation would also further limit the scope for tensions under the Windsor Framework, or for level-playing-field disputes with the EU.